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Th e Buddhist Notion of Emptiness 
and its Potential Contribution to Psychology and Psychotherapy
José M. Tirado
Saybrook Graduate School
Hafnarfj ordur, Iceland
A growing number of psychologists now have their practices and theories informed by Bud-
dhist meditation practices. Th ese practices, however, are themselves deeply informed by the 
Buddhist notion of emptiness (śūnyatā). Th is Buddhist concept oﬀ ers a rich vein of possibili-
ties in informing psychology and psychotherapy. Th e present paper examines the develop-
ment and potential of this concept for inﬂ uencing these and other areas. 
In his ﬁ rst book, Th oughts Without a Th inker: Psycho-therapy from a Buddhist Perspective, Epstein (1995) beautifully encapsulated within the title s´ ﬁ rst 
clause a potentially innovative contribution to modern 
psychology. Within this intriguing statement are hints of 
the Buddhist concept of emptiness, including its possible 
beneﬁ ts, prospective applications, and impact on psycho-
therapy. For if there really is no thinker, who precisely 
is caught up in the snares of psychological illnesses? 
Elaborating on this question, Epstein has said that “this 
emphasis on the lack of a particular, substantive agent 
is the most distinctive aspect of traditional Buddhist 
psychological thought” (p. 41). He also suggested, 
correctly, that this Buddhist notion of a lack of “self” 
may point us toward a new understanding of conscious-
ness. 
 Th e Buddhist answer to this question of who 
suﬀ ers might be posited as follows: the attachment to the 
sense of a thinker is the ultimate source of our illness, and 
therefore, upon release from this conﬁ ning ﬁ xation, our 
illness will subside. Yet to whom does this attachment or 
ﬁ xation occur? Our very use of a language that requires 
subjects and objects, referring to essential entities and 
things, becomes problematic from a Buddhist standpoint 
because what is being pointed at is said to be insubstantial, 
possessed of an ineﬀ able nature. Th e potential contribu-
tions this notion might oﬀ er to the world of psychology 
and psychotherapy are therefore signiﬁ cant. 
 While the accumulation of material goods and 
the ever-increasing ﬁ lling up of our lives with more 
invasive forms of entertainment and communication 
accelerates at seemingly breakneck speed, few would 
suggest that our collective lives have become more whole. 
Even with an abundance of easily available psychothera-
peutic modalities, hardly any would say we have become 
happier or less neurotic. Who can dismiss entirely the 
tongue-in-cheek title of a book co-penned by Jungian 
analyst James Hillman (Hillman & Ventura, 1993), 
We’ve Had a Hundred Years of Psychotherapy and the 
World’s Getting Worse? 
 Since Buddhism argues that grasping onto the 
notion of a self is at the root of the most essential existen-
tial human problem, Buddhist critiques of this notion of 
the self might helpfully address the narcissistic emphases 
of psychology. Th ese critiques are salient because, as 
Epstein (1995) stated, the overwhelming dis-ease of 
the human condition is narcissism, which he deﬁ ned in 
part as “the inability to tolerate unpleasant truths about 
oneself” (p. 48). According to Epstein, “the Buddha was 
articulating a vision of a psyche freed from narcissism” 
(p. 41), adding that, “all the insults to our narcissism can 
be overcome, the Buddha proclaimed, not by escaping 
them but by uprooting the conviction in a ‘self ’ that 
needs protecting” (p. 45). Few concepts seem as eminently 
suited for such a task as the central Buddhist concept 
of emptiness. Th is concept directly challenges the very 
notion of an independent, inherently existent self and 
therefore oﬀ ers an initially uncomfortable but possibly 
groundbreaking palliative to some of the most pressing 
psychological diﬃ  culties in the human condition. Th e 
positive interpretation of emptiness allows for a philo-
sophically deconstructed yet healthily adaptive self that 
responds to psychological challenges with neither narcis-
sistic myopia nor dissociative fragmentation.
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 It is the purpose of this paper to brieﬂ y deﬁ ne 
and describe the ramiﬁ cations of adopting this Buddhist 
idea into the realm of psychology and thereby hopefully 
contribute a bit to its understanding and possible use.
Emptiness
 Th e English word, emptiness, is universally 
agreed upon as a proper translation of the Sanskrit word, 
śūnyatā. Śūnyatā has been deﬁ ned as, “the ultimate nature 
of reality which is the total absence of inherent existence 
and self-identity with respect to all phenomena” (Coleman, 
1993, p. 304 [emphasis added]). It is further character-
ized more speciﬁ cally as “empty and void of Perma-
nency, of true Happiness, Personality, and Pleasantness” 
(Nyanatiloka, 1952, p. 132). Th us, “being devoid of any 
phenomenal characteristics, ‘void’ or ‘the indescribable’ 
is the real nature of things” (Grimes, 1989, p. 354).
 Th e word śūnyatā is made of two parts: śūnya 
or “empty” (its root –svi refers to being swollen, as in 
a belly, and this lends itself to the image of a swollen 
belly, presently devoid of any contents, but laden with 
possibilities) and –tā, describing the quality of being 
ascribed to the former part of speech (i.e., equivalent to 
the English suﬃ  x –ness): thus, empty-ness. Since within 
most Western languages this writer is familiar with the 
notion of emptiness is understood as pejoratively negative, 
describing the absence of any thing (nihilism in Buddhist 
terms), it might be less misleading and more helpful to 
follow the broader Buddhist development of this idea as 
Buddhism moved from India to Tibet, China, Japan, 
and Korea. 
 It should be noted at the outset that the Buddha 
made clear his determination to keep the interpretation 
of his teachings away from the two extremes of what 
he called nihilism and eternalism. Th e former position, 
nihilism, would argue that nothingness is the natural 
conclusion derived from analyzing the nature of self as 
empty. Th is lent itself to the rejection of any Ultimate 
Reality and denial of the possibility of apprehending 
anything beyond our senses. It had potentially disastrous 
consequences morally as well, for if no ultimate standard 
for moral behavior exists, it could be argued that no 
restraints on moral behavior are necessary.
 Th e latter concept of eternalism was akin to 
Vedantic beliefs in (1) the soul, an eternal, transmigrating 
entity possessed of an inherent identity, and (2) God, the 
Ultimate substratum of Reality representing Reality in 
its truest sense. With regard to this sense of a personal 
self, “it seems that human dispositions…tend to move…
in two diﬀ erent directions….the ﬁ rst is in the direction 
of absolute negation….the other is in the direction of 
making it a permanent and eternal reality” (Kalupahana, 
1987, p. 40). Neither position was correct according to 
the Buddha, and both represented distortions of his own 
“Middle Way.” Th is said, it should be noted that, “both 
Madhyamaka and Advaita Vedanta deny that ultimate 
reality can be understood in a dualistic manner” (King, 
1995, p. 135 [emphasis added]).
 Th e eﬀ ort to translate religious or spiritual 
terms from one language to another is always fraught 
with diﬃ  culty. It was no diﬀ erent in the transition from 
the literary, spiritual languages of the Indian subconti-
nent, Pali and Sanskrit, to East Asia, where many of the 
languages adopted the Chinese ideographs (known in 
Japanese as kanji) as the whole or part of their own writing 
systems. Th ese ideographs were able to visually contain a 
wealth of information, deposited as it were within each 
sub-section (called a radical) of the character, from which 
literally tens of thousands of compounds with multiple 
meanings could then be made. Th e languages themselves 
(Chinese in particular, certainly Japanese as well) were 
quite comfortable with ambiguities and subtleties, diﬀ er-
entiating them from the precision and deﬁ nitive clarity 
of, say, Sanskrit. Th e ideograph adopted to represent this 
word, śūnyatā, is ku ? ?, which means, “sky, [to] make/
be unoccupied, empty” (Hadamitzky & Spahn, 1997, p. 
92). Its signiﬁ cance in this discussion lies in the tradi-
tionally dual expositions of its value as a synonymous 
reading for śūnyatā. 
 Th e reasoning of the ﬁ rst reading went as follows: 
as the sky is not a thing but rather, a space, it can be 
said to be without solidity, empty of things and thingness. 
It only hosts, so to speak, all passing phenomena, 
remaining without inherent identity or substance (a bird, 
for example, in the literal sky image, and thoughts, for 
its application to objects of consciousness). So too with 
śūnyatā. Th is was the negative formulation. “It does not 
mean that things do not exist but rather that they are 
nothing but appearances” (Schuhmacher & Woerner, 1989, 
pp. 330-331 [emphasis added]). Traditional Zen imagery, 
the moon’s reﬂ ection in a dew drop for example, capture 
somewhat the essence of what mistaking the image for 
the reality might be like. 
 Th ere remained however another positive formu-
lation most emphasized by various Tibetan schools, which 
asserted that, while the sky itself is empty of substance, 
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it might also be characterized as a self-luminous back-
ground to all phenomena, mental or physical, and 
pregnant with inﬁ nite possibilities. “While emptiness 
is indicated in traditional Madhyamaka by saying what 
it is not, in Mahamudra and Dzogchen it is viewed in 
positive terms. Śūnyatā here becomes ‘openness’ that is 
inseparable from clarity (luminosity)” (Schuhmacher & 
Woerner, 1989, p. 331). 
 Th is positive aspect might be of most interest in 
modern consciousness studies and its practical applications 
within the realm of psychotherapy. By way of example, 
the patient who is oﬀ ered a positive, open-ended vision 
of their full potentialities, beyond any and all aspects of 
their presenting conditions, will be empowered far more 
than the one oﬀ ered a more constricted sense of self by 
the therapist. As well, changes in consciousness associ-
ated with positive mental states have been examined quite 
a bit of late, including promising research involving the 
Dalai Lama whose interest in these matters has proven 
helpful to scientists studying their relationship.
Emptiness, Language, and a Psychology of Self
 Western psychology is rooted in an understand-
ably Western view of individuality: a separate self, relating 
to a world of separate entities. Th is view might also be 
alternatively described as a Judeo-Christian model with 
regards to soul and a Cartesian-Newtonian model with 
regards to matter. All of which together represent the 
foundation of most of what is characterized as Western 
thought. Th e interaction of these separate entities forms 
dynamic relationships, which, through those interactions, 
can positively or negatively aﬀ ect each of the entities in 
relationship. For example, when internal views about the 
entities outside or the internal components of the indi-
vidual become distorted or inappropriately focused upon, 
then psychological diﬃ  culties may occur.
 By contrast, Eastern psychologies (if we may use 
that word in this context) are thoroughly informed by 
ideas predisposed towards a more collective view of what 
constitutes an individual and the world around one. “A 
sharp distinction between individualism and collec-
tivism…characterizes important analyses of Western 
versus Asian approaches [to psychology]” (Rao, 2002, p. 
265). A brief examination of the Japanese understanding 
of individuals might be helpful here. 
 Kasulis (1981), in Zen Action, Zen Person, 
expounded on deﬁ nitions of self in Japanese Zen and 
their relationships to related Western ideas. In Japanese, 
several words are used in speaking of a person: the terms 
kojin, ningen, and hito are all used in diﬀ erent contexts. 
However, as this is a great deal due to Buddhist inﬂ u-
ences upon the language and society he noted that, 
when the Japanese see someone as an “individual” 
(kojin), they see him or her as one object among 
many, but when they see someone as a “human being” 
(ningen), they see that person in a context….While 
the ‘individual’ (kojin) is a real entity, one most fully 
becomes a  ´human being’ (ningen) when one is in 
relationship….Th e individual becomes meaningful 
insofar as he or she is an outgrowth of the relation-
ships established by the operative context, not vice 
versa (pp. 6, 9; emphasis added).
 We should note that this notion of emptiness, or 
at least a set of analogous concepts or positions, has been 
tested or touched upon and essentially rejected by Western 
thought: Heraclitus, with his image that everything ﬂ ows 
and that you cannot step in the same river twice (Russell, 
1984), is one example. Hume, with his empirical observa-
tion that self, other, cause, eﬀ ect, and more are all merely 
habits of mind and concepts overlaid on the bare world of 
experience, is another. Daniel Dennett, with his notion 
of the mind as having no continuity or unchanging self 
(see Rao, 2002) would be a third. So why has the West 
run screaming from this idea? How is it that Buddhism 
approaches non-self in such a way that is less terrifying 
in the East than in the West? In fact, what the Buddha 
posited was that instead of a solid, inherent self, there was 
only “a changing stream of becoming…constantly fed by 
perceptions,” which “does not represent a static entity to 
which everything belongs” (Kalupahana, 1987, p. 38). 
 We may further understand the importance 
of emptiness by looking at its relationship to another 
important Buddhist idea, dependent origination, or 
pratīitya samutpāda. Th is notion, described by some as 
interconnectedness, was sometimes utilized to justify the 
nascent inﬂ ux of emptiness into later Buddhist thought. 
Since interconnectedness was regarded as an early 
Buddhist teaching and therefore considered authorita-
tive, its general thrust contained seeds for a new way of 
viewing self. By saying that there exists no thing whose 
full identity, arising, sustenance, and eventual passing, 
was not due to elaborately intertwined matrices of rela-
tionships to other things similarly entangled, it implied 
that nothing therefore existed as an inherently inde-
pendent unit. “Pratitya samutpada is…the principle 
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of…the essential dependence of things on each other, 
i.e., the unreality of separate elements” (Murti, 1980, 
p. 7 [emphasis in original]). Th is concept could then be 
extrapolated to characterize the nature of all existence as 
emptiness—empty of substance, of properties that suggest 
solidity in identity, and of deﬁ nitive characterization.
 It was Nāgārjuna, writing in the 2nd/3rd 
cent. CE (Murti,  1980), with his collected aphorisms 
and dialectic analyses, who ingeniously revived a then-
moribund Buddhist movement by putting forth his 
middle path, or Madhyamaka. “Th e function of the 
Madhyamika dialectic is not to bring about a change in 
things but in our mentality” (p. 233). Nāgārjuna did not 
deny the existence of things as phenomena, but declared 
their absence of essence. “Th us it is false to say that things 
exist or that they do not exist. Th e truth lies in the middle, 
in emptiness” (Schuhmacher & Woerner, 1989, p. 238).
 “Nāgārjuna endeavored to undermine Indian 
(non-Buddhist as well as abhidharmic) arguments about 
causality by proving the relationship between cause and 
eﬀ ect to be neither absolute nor unparadoxical” (Kasulis, 
1981, p. 20). For Nagarjuna, “concepts are samvriti; they 
literally ‘cover’ or ‘obstruct’ the way things are actually 
experienced” (p. 23). Releasing ourselves from the 
propensity to conceptualize, and therefore, to reify the 
objects of our experience, we liberate ourselves from the 
most ensnaring of human propensities associated with 
our minds. Th is is the inevitable and invariant grasping 
after the objects of experience, traditionally delineated as 
1) the desire to get those things we want, 2) to avoid the 
things we do not wish to be near to, and 3) to cling to the 
memory of things lost. 
 One can easily see the areas in which such a 
perspective might be put to use in psychology. It is possible 
to suggest that most psychotherapy clients, at least those 
in non-psychotic or extreme dissociative conditions, are 
involved in one way or another with some ﬁ xation of at 
least one of these three conditions. A person aﬀ ected by 
compulsive gambling, obsessively avoiding cracks in the 
sidewalk, or grieving inconsolably from the traumatic 
memory of parental loss might all respectively be speciﬁ c 
examples of these three aﬄ  ictions.
 Aside from Buddhism, most other Indian 
schools of thought still accept the notion of a deeper 
substratum of individuality, one that is more self than 
the provisionally understood individual “self.” When we 
look at Sāmkhya or Vedanta, two dominant philosoph-
ical trends still surviving within the various strands of 
Hinduism, then we see the utter reliance upon this notion 
of a deeper substratum of existence. Th is substratum may 
also be described as the sense that beneath, or, better put, 
beyond the phenomenal world we experience lies a more 
real Reality. However, emptiness according to Buddhism 
undercuts this notion as well, arguing that any imputa-
tion we ascribe to existence remains an imputation and 
little else. Th us, the intellectual and linguistic precision 
normally used in stripping language of its propensities to 
reify concepts is here brought to bear on considerations 
of religious import. Th is process may be subsequently 
applied to a psychological context and in so doing, 
might illuminate a new angle for addressing other age-
old problems. Th ese problems are related to the ontology, 
epistemology, and phenomenology of being, of conscious-
ness and human life itself. 
 Kasulis (1981) has written, “since language can 
never leave its own constructs and internal rules, it cannot 
serve as a vehicle for philosophical truth” (p. 22 [emphasis 
in original]). One might add as well that language 
presents no vehicle for psychological truth, for the same 
limiting reasons Nāgārjuna has so amply demonstrated 
(Murti, 1980). But the search for philosophical Truth 
is not generally considered the driving motivation in 
psychological practice. Insights, cures, solutions, reasons, 
suggestions, therapies, counsel, answers, and directions 
are more along the line of what is sought. Here again 
we are presented with emptiness’s unusual utility, for it 
squarely confronts the ultimate inadequacies of all these 
and directs the pursuer back to the ﬂ uidity of experience 
itself. In so doing it begins to peel away, layer after layer, 
the errant presumptions in all our questioning, leading 
toward a state of unknowing. While one might initially 
approach anxiously, with context and guidance this 
unknowing can prove as liberating as realizing the sky’s 
immeasurable potentiality versus its insubstantiality. 
 We have already suggested that the Buddhist 
notion of emptiness can provide an excellent series of 
ideas that may inform the therapeutic encounter. “Th e 
suﬀ ering of the false self derives from attachment to 
the two extremes of self-suﬃ  ciency and emptiness. By 
bringing awareness to those very attachments, they can 
be released” (Epstein, 1995, p. 67). It is not too hard 
to imagine (and Epstein provides concrete examples of 
such) psychotherapists utilizing insights derived from 
meditation or the contemplation of emptiness in order to 
assist clients in loosening the seemingly intractable grasp 
many have on their problems. Th is eﬀ ort, in fact, has 
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been explored in a number of areas. For example, both 
Fenner (1995) and Wilber (1997) have said some inter-
esting things about its possible application in psychology. 
In addition, there have been eﬀ orts to incorporate 
Buddhist mindfulness practices with cognitive behav-
ioral therapies (Hayes, Strosahl, & Wilson, 1999; Kabat-
Zinn, 1994; Linehan, 1993a, 1993b; Segal, Williams, & 
Teasdale, 2002). Th erapies incorporating mindfulness 
alone (Germer, 2005) or programs utilizing variations of 
Buddhist mindfulness-based meditation for group coun-
seling (Tirado, 2007) are also becoming more common.
 Epstein (1995) wrote, “the true self experience 
that has come to preoccupy Western analysis is achiev-
able most directly through the appreciation of what the 
Buddhists would call emptiness of self” (p. 72). Th is 
self, a more ﬂ uid, less centralized (non)entity may be 
compared to an ever-ﬂ owing sea whose waters can roll 
over any obstacle and whose depth belies any notion of 
its insubstantiality. 
Conclusion
 We might summarize the Buddhist perspective 
as saying that, once ﬁ rmly convinced that our nature is 
occluded by a number of delusions (most important of 
which is the delusion that we have a “nature” or a ﬁ xed, 
inherent self), only then might we begin the therapy that 
relieves not only our psychological illness, but our exis-
tential anxieties as well. We may actually come to expe-
rience, rather than simply intellectually conclude, that, 
“disturbing thought patterns and their corresponding 
emotional reactions are baseless, or lack any foundation,” 
and that therefore, “the problems themselves [become] 
impotent or incapable of drawing mental attention and 
energy” (Fenner, 1995, p. 166).
 But the great challenge to traditional Western 
psychology may be less disruptive than the implications 
of what a more interconnected, less centrally placed, 
separate individual might mean to an entire culture built 
upon selﬁ shness and narcissistic materialism. Any such 
challenge is bound to disturb the philosophical under-
pinnings of so much of our distinctly Western cultures so 
that novel ways of constructing our societal relations may 
be required, with implications for our social economic 
structures. While the inﬂ uence of Buddhist ideas such 
as interconnectedness or emptiness has not necessarily 
tempered consumerist or material excesses in Eastern 
societies, there remain many areas from where the West 
can learn. 
 While the initial reaction to any therapeutic use 
of the notion of emptiness might be a frightening sense of 
identity loss, a separate internally more positive movement 
may also occur, that is, one of recognizing a diﬀ erent self 
diﬀ erently conceived and diﬀ erently constructed. Th is 
self, acknowledged as an empirically veriﬁ able, practical 
but ultimately provisional concept, can be utilized to reach 
potentially new heights of human integration. We might 
further state that any insights emptiness has to oﬀ er may 
suggest modiﬁ cation to our current models of conscious-
ness. For example the positive aspect of emptiness, which 
has been described within later Buddhist traditions as the 
tathāgatagarbha, literally the “Buddha-womb,” is also the 
womb of unfettered possibilities.  Th is notion comports 
quite comfortably with the humanistic and transpersonal 
movements in psychology and their goals for ennobling 
the human condition. 
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